|
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THE BENEFITS OF
DIVERSIFICATION
1981 - 2007
|
|
|
Year |
100%
Stocks |
100%
Bonds |
60%Stocks
40%Bonds |
Stocks
Bonds
Cash
(1/3 in each) |
5 Asset Class
Diversified
Portfolio* |
| 1981 |
- 4.9% |
1.9% |
- 2.0% |
4.1% |
8.7% |
| 1982 |
21.4% |
40.4% |
29.0% |
24.0% |
20.6% |
| 1983 |
22.5% |
0.7% |
13.4% |
10.5% |
15.4% |
| 1984 |
6.3% |
15.4% |
10.1% |
10.8% |
12.4% |
| 1985 |
32.2% |
22.1% |
28.6% |
20.8% |
25.4% |
| 1986 |
18.5% |
15.3% |
17.2% |
13.4% |
23.3% |
| 1987 |
5.2% |
2.8% |
4.2% |
5.0% |
8.6% |
| 1988 |
16.8% |
7.9% |
13.1% |
10.8% |
13.2% |
| 1989 |
31.5% |
14.5% |
24.8% |
18.4% |
16.5% |
| 1990 |
- 3.2% |
9.0% |
1.7% |
4.7% |
12.6% |
| 1991 |
30.6% |
16.0% |
24.7% |
17.4% |
18.7% |
| 1992 |
7.7% |
7.4% |
7.5% |
6.2% |
5.3% |
| 1993 |
10.0% |
9.8% |
10.0% |
7.7% |
12.6% |
| 1994 |
1.3% |
-
2.9% |
- 0.4% |
1.1% |
2.0% |
| 1995 |
37.4% |
18.5% |
29.9% |
20.7% |
19.2% |
| 1996 |
23.1% |
3.6% |
15.2% |
10.7% |
15.8% |
| 1997 |
33.4% |
9.7% |
23.9% |
16.2% |
16.6% |
| 1998 |
28.6% |
8.7% |
20.6% |
14.2% |
9.6% |
| 1999 |
21.0% |
-
0.8% |
12.5% |
8.7% |
9.0% |
| 2000 |
- 9.1% |
11.6% |
- 0.8% |
3.0% |
4.3% |
| 2001 |
-11.9% |
8.4% |
- 3.8% |
0.2% |
- 0.7% |
| 2002 |
-23.4% |
10.3% |
- 9.9% |
-10.7% |
- 3.7 |
| 2003 |
28.7% |
18.8% |
4.1% |
11.3% |
21.0% |
| 2004 |
10.9% |
4.3% |
8.3% |
5.7% |
13.8% |
| 2005 |
4.9% |
2.4% |
3.9% |
3.8% |
6.5% |
| 2006 |
15.8% |
4.3% |
11.2% |
7.9% |
17.0% |
| 2007 |
5.5% |
7.0% |
6.1% |
5.3% |
2.3% |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Compound
Annual Return |
12.69% |
10.49% |
11.31% |
9.68% |
12.50% |
|
# of Years
with Positive
Returns |
22 |
25 |
22 |
26
|
25 |
|
Standard
Deviation -
Risk Levels
of various
Portfolio Mixes |
16.24%
|
9.01%
|
11.36% |
7.76%
|
7.44% |
| |
|
|
|
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|
Stocks: S&P 500 Index, Bonds: Lehman Agg. Bond
Index, Cash: 180 day C.D.
*Diversified Portfolio: 20% S&P 500, 20%
Lehman Aggregate Bond Index, 20% Equity REITS, 20% MSCI World Index
(International), 20% Cash. Assumes annual rebalancing. Sources:
Morningstar, Ibbotson, Thomson Fin'l, NAREIT
|
DIVERSIFICATION, "AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME", AGAIN
The very hallmark of suitability is diversification. To uphold the
fiduciary duty of implementing only suitable investments, the broker must
avoid over-concentration at all costs in favor of a diversified portfolio.
The more aggressive the objectives of the investor, the more necessary it is
to diversify the investor's assets to mitigate the risk (see Legal Duties of
Stockbrokers - Duty to Diversify).
With the tremendous gains in the S&P 500 during the mid-90's, one would
have been hard pressed to encourage investors to venture away form the
rampaging stock market. However, the technology crash in the NASDAQ and the recent two-year double digit downturn in the S&P 500 has
caused investors once again to turn their attention to diversify their
portfolios. Investors now want to reduce their risk and lower their
concentration in technology at all costs.
The above chart shows the compounded annual returns between 1981 and 2004 in
five various portfolio mixes. At first blush, one would feel justified
for having ventured only into the S&P 500 for the last 24 years. But
take a closer look at the five asset class diversified portfolio in column
five.
Compared to column one, there were 22 years of positive returns instead of
only 19. In other words, with the extra balance, the investor was able
to sleep more comfortably for three more years. During the four year
period from 2000 through 2002, the investor in stocks only would have lost
over 43% of invested capital. However, during that same four year period, in
the diversified portfolio, the account would have basically broken
even! This at a time when, according to Lipper, Inc, the average
diversified stock mutual fund lost 34.3% between 2000 and 2002. In
terms of market loss and measured against the market's all time highs, the
Dow Jones Industrials were down (32%), the S&P 500 had fallen 49%, while
the NASDAQ was down a staggering 74%. Between 2000 and 2003, the
S&P 500 lost nearly 16% while the 5 diversified asset classes gained
21%! The results speak for themselves. In 2004, the 5 asset
classes outperformed stocks alone because the low returns of bonds and cash
were more than offset by international returns of 20.3% and returns in
equity REITS of 31.6%.
Further, from the chart, you can see that the diversified portfolio over the entire
24 years under-performed
the 100% stock portfolio by .29%. Notice the level of risk by
comparison. The S&P 500 had a standard deviation of 16.24% over the
period compared to only 7.44% for the diversified portfolio, less than half
the level of risk. Standard
deviation is a measure of volatility indicating the amount by which most of
the returns varied around the average. The higher the standard
deviation, the greater the volatility and thus the greater the risk.
For example, a security with a standard deviation of 10% indicates that most (two-thirds) of
the actual returns over a particular time period varied around the average
return by plus or minus 10% - in other words, if the average return was 17%,
most of the actual returns ranged from 7% to 27%. Or, you could apply
the concept of standard deviation to the market in general. Over the
last 3 years, the S&P 500 has had a standard deviation of approximately
20%. If your return expectation was a 10% average annual return for
the future, you could expect that return to fluctuate between a high of 30%
and a low of -10%. With the graying of America, investors are continually looking for returns
and results that they can rely upon, on an ongoing basis. A
diversified portfolio in five non-overlapping asset classes, with reduced
volatility, helps provide the probable assurance of verifiable consistency.
Finally, in the late 90's, investors strayed far away from
the S&P 500 and implemented large positions in the tech-heavy NASDAQ to
their detriment incurring losses well in excess of 50% from 2000 through
2002 with this concentration.
As has been previously indicated, the S&P
500, which is market-capitalization weighted, was down 23.4% in 2002 and 11.9% in 2001.
However, according to James B, Cloonan, Ph.D., Chairman of the American
Association of Individual Investors, in the April, 2002 AAII Journal, "a portfolio of the same 500 stocks, equally weighted, would have
been up 1.63% for the year. The NASDAQ Composite Index, also
market-capitalization weighted, was down 20.13% in 2001 alone, but those
same 4,000 stocks bought in equal dollar amounts would have been up 63.86%!
This seems incredible, but recall almost all the losses on the NASDAQ were
in the high-cap. technology stocks. In contrast, micro-cap. stocks
(companies whose market capitalization is below $250 million) had a banner year".
Further, according to the AAII Journal/November 2002, "Over the last 10
years the Wilshire 5000 index has had an average annual return (through
September 30, 2002) of 8.69%. However, the return of the Wilshire 5000
unweighted by market capitalization (in other words, the average stock in
the Wilshire 5000), is 14.17% a year. And to throw in another
shocker: The NASDAQ Composite index is down dramatically year to date,
with a return of -39.26%, yet the average stock on the NASDAQ is up 30.54%,
and the average stock has been up each year for the past three
years". Actually, 37% of all U.S. stocks had a positive return in
the year 2002. The average return of those stocks that did have a
positive return was an astonishing 43.4%. The point about market
indexes is this. Because of the dependence upon market capitalization
weighting, the U.S. equity market as a whole is generally not performing as
well, or as badly, as the major benchmarks indicate.
The S&P 500, on an equally weighted basis has performed well over
time. It is available as an ETF under the symbol RSP (Rydex S&P
equal weighted ETF), and is traded on the ASE. The symbol of the index
itself is SPXEW. During the period 2000 to 2005, it
had a six-year annualized return of 8.96% compared with -1.13% for the
S&P 500. Over the 16 hear period from 1990 to 2005, SPXEW's annualized return of 12.42% was 187 basis points higher than the S&P
500. Moreover, the volatility of the index as measured by standard
deviation was 172 basis points lower than the S&P 500!
While the NASDAQ Composite Index was and is heavily weighted with large-cap technology
& telecom stocks, the S&P 500 was far less
concentrated. Consider the S&P 500 concentration (by market
capitalization) in tech/telecom at the
following periods:
9/99
12/99
6/00
12/00
6/01
12/01
6/02
31%
37%
39%
27%
24%
21%
15%
Note: The S&P 500,
by number, currently has 26 telecom stocks, 19 software stocks and 15 computer related stocks, totaling
60 issues out of 500 for a total of 12% "technology & telecom"!
Since its high in June, 2000, the percentage of tech/telecom, in terms of
market capitalization value, has steadily declined. The technology/telecommunications concentration in the S&P 500 as reported in the Wall Street
Journal on June 25, 2002 was only 15%, and 20% by 12-31-02.
By contrast, the
technology/telecom concentration in the NASDAQ Composite Index between 12/99 and
3/00 averaged 63% in
terms of market capitalization value. As of late 2002, the NASDAQ was still over
50% invested in tech/telecom. And consider a comparison between the
NASDAQ Composite Index and the Dow Jones Industrials as of March,
2000. The NASDAQ was trading at 172.2 times the past years earnings of
its 100 component stocks! In June 2005, the current P/E ratio
of the NASDAQ 100 is 30. By contrast, the Dow Jones was trading at
22.5 times the past years earnings of its 30 component stocks as of March,
2000. Currently, its P/E ratio is17.6.
The 12.89% average annual return in the S&P 500 for the entire 23 year
period was only available
for those investors who remained there during the technology boom. Many strayed to the NASDAQ through their own greed along with that of their
advisors (seeking the higher performance of dot-com and tech. issues) and
they experienced necessarily a much lower compounded annual return
through 2002. They participated in this high risk technology
concentration usually without any protection or exit strategy i.e. stop
losses, protective puts or custom collars. Further, rather than their
brokers selling or cushioning the decline in value of this 100% concentrated
stock portfolio, many brokers bought more or "averaged down"
during the market decline. At the end of last year, large-cap
technology stocks (those in the top half of the Russell's index of the 1,000
biggest U.S. stocks, traded at 33 times the past year's earnings.
Technology stocks in the Russell 2000, an index of small-cap stocks, had a
price-to-earnings ratio of 59. This when earnings growth for both
small and large technology companies were about the same over the past two
years, suggesting that small-cap technology stocks don't deserve such high
valuations compared with their larger peers.
Tech-heavy mutual funds joined the internet explosion in high risk NASDAQ
issues as well. In December 1998 there were a total of 48 technology
equity funds (as defined by the Morningstar Principia Pro software).
By the end of 2000 there were 118 tech. funds - an increase of 146%.
The bulge in tech. portfolios took place between June 1996 and December
2000. In the short space of 19 months, 70 new equity funds with a
heavy weighting in technology were launched. These totals only consider
distinct, surviving portfolios as of April, 2003.
As we observe the markets rebounding nicely in 2003 (the
market overall was up over 40% according to the VAY index), we must remind ourselves
of the valuable lesson history has taught us! In the last 23 years the
five asset class diversified portfolio has performed virtually equivalent to
the growth stock portfolio, but with less than half the level of risk.
It will take all or our resolve to remember that historical truism. No
one can be sure that the market has bottomed out. Historically, there
have been 5 bear markets since the depression. A bear market is
defined as lasting more than 12 months in a period where stocks lost at
least 20% of their value. The bear markets were 1929-1932; 1940-1942;
1968-1970; 1973-1974 and 1980-1982. More currently, the Wilshire 5000
total return index declined by 46% from its March, 2000 top to its October,
2002 low. Only diversification can sustain us through the unchartered waters
of these uncertain times.
The point is this: Sector sizzle will come and go just like it always
has. Conversely, investors planning for retirement want their
retirement funds to grow consistently with the realistic probability of controlling
risk levels. A diversified portfolio does that. Once again, it is "an
idea whose time has come".
Historical
Portfolio Returns: 1/79 – 12/02
Stock % Bond % Ave.
Annual Return
Standard Deviation*
0% 100%
9.6% 6.4%
10% 90%
9.8% 6.4%
20% 80%
10.0% 6.7%
30% 70%
10.2% 7.3%
40% 60%
10.3% 8.1%
50% 50%
10.4% 9.1%
60% 40%
10.4% 10.3%
70% 30%
10.5% 11.5%
80% 20%
10.5% 12.8%
90% 10%
10.4% 14.2%
100% 0% 10.4% 15.6%
Stocks: Russell 3000
Bonds: Lehman Aggregate Bond Index
Assuming 15% capital gains and
dividend taxes and a 40% effective tax rate on current income the
following results were achieved between 1-1-90 and
12-21-2003, on an after tax basis:
ANNUALIZED
ANNUALIZED
ASSET CLASS AVERAGE
RETURN STANDARD DEVIATION
Bonds
4.64%
3.69%
International
Equity
1.43%
16.20%
Emerging Market Equity
4.24%
22.37%
Small-Cap
Stocks
8.28%
18.15%
Large-Cap
Stocks
8.60%
14.21%
Municipal
Bonds
6.37%
4.65%
Abandoning bonds is as foolish now as it was in 1999! Investors should
note that maintaining a 30% allocation in fixed income securities cuts
portfolio volatility by one-third, but with negligible upside impairment.
Instead of trying to guess, we look for sound investment opportunities with
low correlations to U.S. stocks and combine them in proportions most
appropriate to each client's needs, objectives and risk/return
profile. For example, the correlations between emerging market stocks
or real estate investment trusts and stocks is quite low. And there's
effectively no correlation between the returns on cash and the returns on
U.S. stocks. You can see that the dollar, too, moves without relation
to the U.S. stock market, which adds to the diversified effect of investing
abroad. With the recent decline in interest rates, and the chance
for increases from historic lows, one needs to
be a bit more creative, utilizing inflation indexed bonds, convertible securities,
mortgage backed securities or laddered Treasury Notes, for example.
Quality high yield non-rated bonds
("junk" but not "trash") should be considered when the
issuer forgoes the cost of a bond rating in favor of increasing the yield to
the investor. Quality corporate bonds could also be
considered. However, one must always keep an eye on default
potential. According to Moody's, for companies started in 1970 to
1997, the mean five-year cumulative rate of default was 0.1% for those with
a top Aaa rating. The default rate climbed to 11.5% for speculative Ba-rated
companies and to 30.8% for B- rated firms (See the following article on junk
bonds). The most compelling reason for including bonds in a
portfolio is again, diversification. Consider the 1970's, a decade
when interest rates increased from 5% to 14%. According to a recent
Ibbotson study, an investor with a 30% allocation to bonds during this
period captured 98% of the total return of stocks with only 73% of the price
volatility. If that statistic isn't convincing enough, consider the
possibility of another market shock, be it a stock market crash a la 1987,
or another terrorist attack on U.S. soil. In the past, bonds acted as
a shock absorber during such tumultuous events, cushioning the bruising
performance of equities. As interest rates begin to rise, regardless
of economic conditions, bonds should be a part of every long-term investor's
holdings. It is prudent, however, to adjust duration and credit spread
exposure as conditions change.
Scorecard - Standard Deviation*
(1 = best - 9 = worst)
Standard Deviation
Volatility Risk Rating
up to 7.99
1
8.00 - 10.99
2
11.00 - 13.99
3
14.00 - 16.99
4
17.00 - 19.99
5
20.00 - 22.99
6
23.00 - 25.99
7
26.00 - 28.99
8
29.00 and up
9
THE BENEFITS OF DIVERSIFICATION (1970-1990)
Stocks
5 Asset
Bonds
Class
100% 100% 60%Stocks Cash
Diversified
Year Stocks Bonds 40%Bonds (1/3
in each) Portfolio*
1970 4.0% 12.1%
7.5% 8.0%
4.7%
1971 14.3% 13.2%
14.1% 10.8%
13.7%
1972 19.0%
5.7% 13.5% 9.4%
15.1%
1973 -14.7%
-1.1% -9.1% -3.0%
-2.2%
1974
-26.4%
4.4% -14.9% -5.4%
-6.6%
1975 37.2% 9.2%
25.7% 17.0%
19.6%
1976 23.8% 16.8%
21.2% 15.2%
11.5%
1977 -7.2% -0.7%
-4.6% -0.9%
6.1%
1978 6.6%
-1.2% 3.7%
4.4% 13.0%
1979 18.4%
-1.2% 10.8%
9.1% 11.5%
1980 32.4% -4.0%
17.5% 13.2%
17.9%
1981 -4.9%
1.9% -2.0%
4.1% 6.4%
1982 21.4% 40.4%
29.0%
24.0% 14.4%
1983 22.5% 0.7%
13.4% 10.5% 15.4%
1984 6.3%
15.4% 10.1% 10.8%
10.4%
1985 32.2% 31.0%
31.9% 23.4% 25.4%
1986 18.5% 24.4%
21.1% 16.6% 23.3%
1987 5.2%
-2.7% 3.6% 3.9%
8.6%
1988 16.8% 9.7%
14.0% 11.0% 13.2%
1989 31.5% 18.1%
26.2% 19.2% 14.3%
1990 - 3.2%
6.2% 0.6%
3.6% - 1.4%
Compound 11.2% 8.7%
10.5% 9.6% 11.2%
Annual Ret.
Standard Dev.
Risk Levels - 16.20%
11.80%
9.53%
8.00%
7.75%
Var. Portfol.
Mixes
# of Years 15
14 16 17
17
with Positive
Returns
Stocks: S&P 500 Index, Bonds: Lehman Agg. Bond Index,
Cash: 180 day C.D.
*Diversified Portfolio: 20% S&P 500, 20% Lehman
Aggregate Bond Index, 20% Equity REITS, 20% MSCI World Index
(International), 20% Cash.
Assumes annual rebalancing.
Sources: Morningstar, Ibbotson, Thomson Fin'l,
NAREIT & BB&K
Index.
HISTORICAL MARKET INDEX ANNUAL RETURNS
DJIA
S & P
500
NASDAQ
ANNUAL RETURN (%) ANNUAL RETURN (%) ANNUAL RETURN (%)
2003
27.4
28.7
33.3
2002
-14.5
-23.4
-31.3
2001
-
5.4
-11.9
-21.1
2000
-
4.7
-
9.1
-39.3
1999
27.0
21.0
85.6
1998
18.0
28.6
39.6
1997
24.8
33.4
21.6
1996
28.6
23.1
22.7
1995
36.5
37.4
39.9
1994
4.9
1.3
- 3.2
1993
16.7
10.0
14.7
1992
7.4
7.7
15.4
1991
23.9
30.6
56.8
1990
-
.6
-
3.2
-17.8
1989
31.7
31.5
19.3
1988
15.9
16.8
15.4
1987
6.0
5.2
- 5.3
1986
26.9
18.5
7.3
1985
32.8
32.2
31.5
1984
1.1
6.3
-11.2
1983
25.6
22.5
19.9
1982
25.8
21.4
18.7
1981
-
3.4
-
4.9
-
3.2
1980
21.4
32.4
33.9
1979
10.5
18.4
28.1
1978
-
3.2
6.6
12.3
1977
-17.3
-
7.2
7.3
1976
21.8
23.8
26.1
1975
45.4
37.2
29.8
1974
-23.1
-26.4
-35.1*
1973
-13.1
-14.7
1972
14.6
19.0
1971
9.8
14.3
1970
8.8
4.0
1969
-11.6
- 8.5
1968
7.7
11.1
1967
15.2
24.0
1966
-18.9
-10.1
1965
14.2
12.5
1964
18.7
16.5
1963
20.6
22.8
1962
-10.8
- 8.7
1961
18.7
26.9
1960
-
9.3
0.5
1959
16.4
12.0
1958
34.0
43.4
1957
-12.8
-10.8
1956
2.3
6.6
1955
20.8
31.6
1954
44.0
52.6
1953
-
3.8
- 1.0
1952
8.4
18.4
1951
14.4
24.0
1950
17.6
31.7
1949
12.9
18.8
1948
-
2.1
5.5
1947
2.2
5.7
1946
-
8.1
- 8.1
1945
26.7
36.4
1944
11.8
19.8
1943
14.1
25.9
1942
7.6
20.3
1941
-15.4
-11.6
1940
-12.7
- 9.8
1939
-
2.9
- 0.4
1938
28.1
31.1
1937
-32.8
-35.0
1936
24.8
33.9
1935
38.5
47.7
1934
4.1
- 1.4
1933
66.7
54.0
1932
-23.1
- 8.2
1931
-52.7
-43.3
1930
-33.8
-24.9
1929
-17.2
- 8.2
1928
49.5
43.6
Average Annual Return
9.2%
12.1%
13.7%
(76
Years)
(76
Years)
(30
Years)
* First year of
NASDAQ Index.
Sources: Bloomberg (Dow Jones & NASDAQ)
Ibbotson (S&P 500)
HIGH YIELD OR “JUNK’ BONDS, HAVEN OR HORROR
By Mason A. Dinehart III, RFC
A high yield, or “junk” bond is a bond issued by a company that
is considered to be a higher credit risk.
The credit rating of a high yield bond is considered
“speculative” grade or below “investment grade”.
This means that th |